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Abstract 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has become widely uses RTP as its media protocol that delivers multimedia sessions over IP 
based network. RTP is the hub of media flooding attacks that causes inconsistency of media transmitted which degrading Quality 
of Service (QoS) and unnecessary resource consumption in servers. Thus, the motto of the paper is revolved around detection of 
RTP flooding attacks. In this paper, Packet Inspection using Statistical (PIS) technique is proposed that detects RTP flooding 
attacks. The experimental results show that the proposed PIS technique has a detection rate of more than 98% with False Positive 
(FP) of less than 0.1%. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016. 
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1. Introduction  
An increasing the number of IP based business applications invent different IP based services. Such applications 
attract consumers by offering low cost with greater flexibility for making a long call over Internet based model. Since 
this fragile architecture of the Internet model and their utility of open standards like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
and RTP contains the provision for intellectual vulnerabilities. The survey papers1,2,3 discussed different types of VoIP 
attacks and solutions. The summarization of these paper revealed that the RTP attacks were less dealt. The flooding 
attacks can be launched by any combination of protocols with different messages from a number of distributed locations 
and spoofing of INVITE messages. In the real time system, those attacks can disturb the QoS along with ongoing 
communication between users.  
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Therefore, both SIP and RTP requires security mechanism to provide a reliable service and hence, many researchers 
focusing towards the signaling attacks detection system that would be either flooding attacks4,5,6 or malformed message 
attacks7,8,9or both9,10,11,12. The authors4,5,6 detect SIP flooding by sketch data structure, which monitor and store specific 
features of SIP traffic. The authors assume that the attacker cannot deduce the normal sketch; this solution is not a 
feasible one in real time application, because the sketch method can change the standard SIP configuration during client 
registration phase. Similarly, the Hellinger Distance12 computes the deviation between training and test set probability 
distribution. But this method is ineffective when four attributes (INVITE, 200 OK, BYE, ACK) are proportionally 
flooded simultaneously and passive monitoring.  
     
2. RTP Flooding Attack 
  
VoIP network requires two level of security mechanism. One for protecting the signaling phases to establishment 
a media session and, other for protecting the media security. Thus, the media security is strongly coupled with 
signaling security, because the media sessions are described by the Session Description Protocol (SDP). Many 
researchers briefly described the SIP flooding2-10. This paper presents the RTP flooding attack; the attacker floods 
the media packets during media conversation phase as shown in Fig.1. Flooding generates a baggage of valid RTP 
voice messages (both the header and the payload are filled with random bytes) over UDP to the targeted clients in a 
dialog phase and makes the server prepare the response messages, with the objective of exhausting bandwidth. This 
can be achieved by hacking of legitimate user credential information (INVITE). Therefore, the sequence number in 
succeeding media packets should increase frequently else we must check the RTP packets of legitimate users5. Such 
consequence of flooding results server overload or crash, unwanted traffic rate, customer service to be delayed or 
frozen, unsuccessful call completion rate and finally, some innocent server to be overloaded. Thereby, the voice call 
quality is affected by intermittent voice transfer.  
 
Fig. 1. An example RTP flooding attack 
3. Proposed Packet Inspection Statistical Technique 
 
The proposed PIS technique consists of two phases namely, feature extraction and decision phase. The PIS 
technique is the first entity to communicate with the clients and capture all SIP and RTP packets as shown in Fig.2. 
In this paper, we examine the media traffic information in terms of request message rate, payload and size of the 
message during the conversation phase. When the request rate increases or the sequence number varies from original 
one, those packets are reported to the SIP server. 
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In the existing flood detection based on HD with sketch5, the training set was captured during attacker in normal 
traffic. The HD method becomes ineffective when attacker changing their strategies. Therefore, in this work, the 
training dataset is said to be completely free of attack packets and used for comparison with the test set. The reason 
is that the legitimate user does not change their calling pattern. In the first phase, extract continuous stream of RTP 
packets without following any media encoding scheme and statistical observations were made for t sec sampling 
duration by running multiple VoIP applications with variable codec. The decision phase calculates the HD between 
the test and training set. If the measured distance exceeds the threshold, identified as the injected media attacks, else, 
the packet is added to the training set.  
 
Fig. 2. The proposed system architecture 
3.1 Feature extraction phase 
The analysis is initiated by running multiple VoIP applications (Skype, Zoiper, Linphone, X-lite and Viber) in ten 
systems running on Windows and Linux kernel in a closed LAN environment. The call was established between 
client and Asterisk server and the traces of the applications were captured in Wireshark for a day, followed by a 
week and finally for a six month and feature extraction was done with a total 14523 calls. Out of different statistical 
features such as payload type, sequence number, timestamp, and SSRC, we concentrated on request message rate, 
payload and size of the message. Request message rate gives the information about the signalling (INVITE, BYE and 
ACK) and media packets for a given time. Payload type is a value indicating which codec is used to encode the 
audio payload and the size of the message indicates the value of message in bits/sec. In addition, the following 
analysis also included, 
 The occurrence of individual events (signalling and media flow) 
 The sequence of the occurrence of the events 
 Duration of the events 
Flooding typically consists of series of media data transferred by p users. The vector representation of the 
frequency of media transferred by individual users gives the least amount of information of the given user series. For 
obtaining the frequency property of individual event, we use a random variable  },....3,2,1{ pSSSS
to represent 
the occurrence of flooding attack that follows a given sequence of events such as INVITE followed by MEDIA 
conversation and then the corresponding BYE by each user. In addition, the sequences of events that are used for 
updating during media transfer such as MEDIA followed by UPDATE followed by INVITE succeeded with the 
MEDIA for each user was also observed. Because, during conversation phase the updating of the media sessions 
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(i.e.,) audio to video and the reverse are updated using signalling messages. Hence, the sequence of these events was 
also observed. Flooding attacks manifest high frequency of a particular event and its corresponding duration 
property is represented using      pSSS ,...., 21 to represent the duration of p different users for the above 
mentioned events. 
3.2  Decision phase 
After extraction of the required payload and size of message features, the decision phase follow mathematical 
model of HD with chi-square test to decide the original media streams and the flooded media streams in RTP. Let 
S={S1,S2,S3,…SP}and R={R1,R2,R3,…RP}be the training and testing vectors of size n with S and R representing the 
frequency of the occurrence of discrete media streams at time t transmitted by each user. By using the data of size n, 
the corresponding mean vector of the training vector S  is calculated },....3,2,1{ pSSSSS  .The respective HD 
between RS  and is given by, 
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The HD satisfies the inequality if S=R. The attributes of MEDIA, INVITE, BYE and ACK are considered, the 
probability measures for each attributes are obtained over the given training data such as SMEDIA, SINVITE, SBYE and 
SACK  for the training set and RMEDIA, RINVITE, RBYE and RACK for the testing set. In order to model the traffic behavior 
along time, threshold is utilised to reflect normal condition and differentiate anomalies. Hence, the packet size of 
150 bytes is maintained and the rate of RTP flooding is gradually increased from 50 packets per second (pps) to 
1000 pps. However, there were fluctuations over time for normal traffic leading to non-stationary of the threshold 
and the maximum distance is identified to be 8*10-3 as shown in Fig.3. However, the existing HD method was 
incorporated for VoIP flooding taking different statistical method into account4,5. The proposed PIS technique 
follows HD along with chi-square test which reduces time complexity with less overhead. The probability at time 
instant t=0 is calculated by observing the number of incoming RTP packets for each stream of media identified with 
source address, destination address and sequence numbering RTPnobserved. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Hellinger distance for the given dataset 
For obtaining the theoretical value RTPntheroritical for the RTP stream is seen from the communication between SIP 
and RTP. Thus, the individual media attribute for each call is integrated together by computed, 
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where, 
i
alntheoreticRTP =packets in the stream i for time t  
The value of RTPtheoritical is assumed to be 50 pps for RTP stream coded with G.711 codec. Anything beyond 
2500 pps is said to be a deviation. The HD is obtained from RTPtheoretical and RTPnobserved . 
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Similarly for the test set, we obtain the values for testing time of t  is, 
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and for the corresponding media stream HD is calculated as, 
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The corresponding variance matrix (Var) for the RTP stream of test and training data is obtained with, 
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We identify Si from the S vector. Let us consider S1be the sequence of events from the first user and Spbe the 
series of events generated by Pth user in the observed call vector. The duration between the first and second user is 
calculated by TSP-TSP-1 at instant t. The required media flooding packet is identified by using the T
2statistic, which is 
calculated by using,    SSVarSST  12  
We calculate the mean, variance and the threshold are computed for each value of the training data. Owing to the 
high computational overhead required for the computation of HD and T2. A chi-square test is performed for the 
training set. The data is said to satisfy the criteria if, 
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However, unlike HD and  T2 the chi-square test does not consider the correlation of variables of events generated 
by individual users in set S and R., rather the value of mean vector (i.e.) the series of events generated by individual 
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users is enough to detect the mean deviations. The required deviation between the real RTP media packet and 
flooded RTP media packet is obtained for time instance t  given by, 
 
 n
i nE
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For each RTP stream over UDP belonging to either of flooded or normal stream, the stream is coded to G  group 
of users. The chi square test is computed for each block of b sub group of users such as i=1,2,3…G.  
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thg block that has a value of i . 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the performance of the proposed technique by examining the results in the 
experimental test. From the table 1, it is observed that as the arrival rate for the server is increased, the number of 
RTP media floods keeps increasing and at a rate of the maximum arrival rate of λ=20, the attack rate increases 
without limit and becomes infinite.  
Table 1. Attack packet distribution 
 
 
 
 
4.1 RTP flooding rate 
The attack rate for the PIS as shown in Fig. 4 is used as a measure for obtaining a statistical result of the number 
of RTP flooded packet generated for a call flow, the graph shows the increasing pattern of attack rate, or a call 
volume of 900 Erlangs, the attack rate is more than 90 packets i.e., attack packets are flooded at an average of 10 
times of original RTP media stream. 
 
Fig. 4. Flooding attack rates 
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Asterisk Server 
2 32 5 52 
5 76 10 76 
8 92 15 97 
10 97 15 153 
15 283 20 500 
18 575 25 730 
(13) 
(12) 
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4.2 RTP flooding detection rate  
Fig. 5 depicts the ability of the proposed PIS technique detecting more attack rates than the HD method for 
increasing arrival rates. From the table I,  it is clear that the attack rate linearly increases as the arrival rate of the 
packet increases, the PIS technique is seen to be 25% more effective in filtering RTP flooding packets. 
 
Fig. 5. Comparision of HD and the proposed PIS technique  
4.3 Testing computation time 
The time complexity for computation of HD for every new incoming packet is )( mnO  , where )(nO
measures the HD computation time during dynamic updation and the time it takes for comparing it with previously 
obtained HD value, hence the testing phase outcome is said to have an additional time lag of )(mO . Whereas, in the 
PIS technique, the threshold is compared only with the metadata of possible values of HD from training phase, the 
overall time complexity for comparison is maintained to )( 2nO . The proposed PIS technique offers reduced 
computation time than the HD is shown in Fig.6. 
 
Fig. 6. Time complexity comparison 
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4.4 False alarm rate (FPR) 
The false alarm rate defines the number of wrongly classified RTP flooded packets. The result is obtained by 
comparing the call volume versus false alarm rate, the PIS technique is found to have a good effect on correctly 
identifying the RTP flooded packet. As the call volume increases, the false alarm rate of misclassified RTP flooded 
packet is less than 0.1 for the technique proposed is shown in Fig.7. 
 
Fig. 7. False alarm rate 
4.5 Hit rate 
The hit rate of the PIS technique is computed by Eq.14,   
iedmisclassif
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The hit rate gives the number of RTP flooded packets correctly identified in the total call volume generated. The 
proposed PIS technique exactly identifies more than 98% of the RTP flooded packets based on the threshold 
computed as shown in Fig.8.  
 
Fig. 8. Proposed PIS technique hit rate 
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           Table 2. False positive and True positive rate 
Method True positive (%) False positive (%) 
Hellinger Distance with 
sketch5 
92.831 8.76 
Proposed PIS technique 98.234 1.87 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided an innovative approach to design a VoIP security system with specific technique for 
RTP flooding attack. The proposed PIS technique detects RTP flooding with an increasing attack rate with a FPR 
less than 0.1 (i.e. less than 10% of misclassification). The experimental result proves that the detection rate of the 
algorithm has more than 98% and thus, from the classified results, the Asterisk server takes action over the packets, 
either to accept or drop the packets. The suspicion technique proposed here is more predictive towards RTP attacks. 
Furthermore, the proposed technique augments the robustness of the secured VoIP network.  
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